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The capacity to collect fingerprints of individuals in online media
has revolutionized the way researchers explore human society. So-
cial systems can be seen as a non-linear superposition of a multitude
of complex social networks, where nodes represent individuals and
links capture a variety of different social relations. Much emphasis
has been put on the network topology of social interactions, how-
ever, the multi-dimensional nature of these interactions has largely
been ignored, mostly because of lack of data. Here, for the first
time, we analyze a complete, multi-relational, large social network
of a society consisting of the 300,000 odd players of a massive mul-
tiplayer online game. We extract networks of six different types of
one-to-one interactions between the players. Three of them carry
a positive connotation (friendship, communication, trade), three a
negative (enmity, armed aggression, punishment). We first analyze
these types of networks as separate entities and find that nega-
tive interactions differ from positive interactions by their lower reci-
procity, weaker clustering and fatter-tail degree distribution. We
then explore how the inter-dependence of different network types
determines the organization of the social system. In particular we
study correlations and overlap between different types of links and
demonstrate the tendency of individuals to play different roles in
different networks. As a demonstration of the power of the ap-
proach we present the first empirical large-scale verification of the
long-standing structural balance theory, by focusing on the specific
multiplex network of friendship and enmity relations.
complex networks | multiplex relations | quantitative sociology
Human societies can be regarded as large numbers of lo-cally interacting agents, connected by a broad range of
social and economic relationships. These relational ties are
highly diverse in nature and can represent e.g. the feeling a
person has for another (friendship, enmity, love), communi-
cation, exchange of goods (trade) or behavioral interactions
(cooperation or punishment). Each type of relation spans a
social network of its own. A systemic understanding of a
whole society can only be achieved by understanding these
individual networks and how they influence and coconstruct
each other. The shape of one network influences the topolo-
gies of the others, as networks of one type may act as a con-
straint, an inhibitor, or a catalyst on networks of another
type of relation. For instance, the network of communica-
tions poses constraints on the network of friendships, trading
networks are usually constrained to positively connoted inter-
actions such as trust, and networks representing hostile ac-
tions may serve as a catalyst for the network of punishments.
A society is therefore characterized by the superposition of
its constitutive socio-economic networks, all defined on the
same set of nodes. This superposition is usually called mul-
tiplex, multi-relational, multi-modal or multivariate network,
see Fig. 1. The study of small-scale multiplex networks has
a long tradition in the social sciences [1], and has been ap-
plied to areas such as homophily in social networks [2], the
effect of combined interactions on an agent’s behavior [3] and
the non-trivial inter-relation between family and business net-
Fig. 1. Multiplex networks consist of a fixed set of nodes connected by different
types of links. This multi-relational aspect is usually neglected in the analysis of large
social networks. In our MMOG data-set, six types of social links can exist between any
two players, representing their friendship or enmity relations, their exchanged private
messages, their trading activity, their one-to-one aggressive acts against each other
(attacks), and their placing of head-money (bounties) on other players as e.g. means
of punishment.
works [4]. Multiplexity is thought to play an important role
in the organization of large-scale networks. For example the
existence of different link types between agents explains the
overlap of community structures observed in social networks,
where nodes may belong to several communities, each associ-
ated to one different type of interaction [5, 6]. Methodolog-
ical work on multiplex networks includes the development of
multiplex community detection [7], clustering [8] and other
network analysis algorithms [9]. The role of multiple relation
types in measured social networks has recently been inves-
tigated across communication media [10], in an online game
[11], as well as in ecological networks [12].
Traditional methods of social science, such as small-scale
questionnaire-based approaches, get more and more replaced
by automated methods of data collection which allow for en-
tirely different scales of analysis [13, 14, 15]. This change of
scale has opened new perspectives and has the potential to
radically transform our understanding of social dynamics and
organization [16]. The empirical verification of social theo-
ries such as the strength of weak ties [17, 18] become possible
with hitherto unthinkable levels of precision. However, this
large-scale perspective suffers from the drawback of a rela-
tively coarse-grained representation of social processes taking
place between individuals and of blindness in respect to the
existence of different types of social interactions. For example
in most works on email [19] or mobile phone networks [17, 20],
the existence and weight of a link is determined by the volume
of information exchanged between two individuals. Although
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nodes can be generally well characterized (age, sex, zip code,
etc.), the corresponding type of interaction (e.g. family or
work interaction), is usually unavailable in the data and can
only be inferred from behavioral patterns [21]. Moreover, re-
search on large social networks has focused on single types
of interaction only, e.g. phone or email communication, and
has ignored the wide spectrum of human interactions in real
life [2]. Whenever inter-dependencies and feedbacks between
multiple relational interactions are significant, an aggregate
representation of the different network types, or the represen-
tation of one single type will lead to a biased and misleading
characterization of the organization of the system.
The following work is an attempt toward fully character-
izing the multiplex nature of a large-scale social system. To
this end we analyze coherent data from a complete society
consisting of about 300,000 players of a massive multiplayer
online game (MMOG) [22]. Having become extremely popu-
lar over the past years, there exists a multitude of large-scale
online games – often played by thousands, sometimes even
millions. These games offer the possibility to experience al-
ternative lives in which players can engage in different types of
social interactions, ranging from establishing friendships and
economic relations to the formation of groups, alliances, fight-
ing and even waging of war [18]. Practically all actions of all
players can be recorded in log files. The booming popularity
of MMOGs opens previously unthinkable potentials for data-
driven, quantitative socio-economic research [23], and enables
e.g. economic surveys [24], studies on group dynamics [25], or
large-scale social network analyses and the testing of classical
sociological hypotheses [18].
The data allows to identify the nature of one-to-one in-
teractions between players; the topological properties of the
corresponding networks – defined on the same set of agents
– can be studied. We show that different types of interac-
tions are characterized by distinct connectivity patterns. Ex-
ploring the inter-dependence of the different networks reveals
how multiplexity shapes the organization of the system at dif-
ferent levels, from the stability of local motifs to the global
overlap between the networks. Moreover, the existence of pos-
itively and negatively connoted interactions between players,
e.g. through declared friendship or enmity, allows to analyze
the organization of the system from the point of view of signed
networks [1]. Within this framework it becomes possible to
experimentally verify structural balance [26], a long-standing
theory in social psychology [27] proposed for understanding
emergence of conflict and tension in social systems [28]. The
central idea behind structural balance is that some configura-
tions of signed motifs, i.e. local ‘building blocks’ of networks
containing positive and/or negative ties, are socially and psy-
chologically more stable than others and are therefore more
likely to be present in human societies. By measuring the dy-
namics and abundance of signed triads (sets of three nodes
connected by positive or negative links), we perform a large-
scale validation of structural balance and provide insights in-
dispensable for a realistic modeling of conflicts.
Results
Nature of the Various Networks. Different types of connectiv-
ity patterns may signal different organization principles be-
hind the formation of networks [29, 30]. Statistical properties
of the six networks, when considered as separated entities,
are collected in Table 1. There, Nα is the number of nodes in
the network α, L
dir(undir)
α is the number of (un)directed links.
Reciprocity is labeled by rα, ρ(k
in
α , k
out
α ) is the correlation of
in- and out degrees within the α network. Average degree,
clustering coefficient, and clustering coefficient with respect
to the corresponding random graph are marked by k¯α, Cα
and Cα/C
rand
α , respectively. For definitions of the measures,
see [SI].
Positive links are highly reciprocal, negative links are not.
Table 1 shows that networks with a positive connotation
[friendship, private messages (PMs) and trades] are strongly
reciprocal [31] (see [SI]), in the sense that node pairs have
a high tendency to form bi-directional connections, while
networks with a negative connotation (enmity, attack and
bounty) all show significantly smaller reciprocity. Low re-
ciprocation in enemy networks may partially be explained by
deliberate refusal of reciprocation to demonstrate aversion by
total lack of response [18]. For attack networks, it may orig-
inate from the asymmetry in the strength of the players (a
strong player is more likely to attack a weaker player to se-
cure a win). Asymmetry in negative relations is confirmed
in the correlations between node in-degrees and out-degrees.
Positive links are almost balanced in the in- and out-degrees,
ρ ∼ 1, whereas negative links show an obvious suppression in
Table 1. Single network properties. Properties of directed networks: number of nodes Nα (connected to at least one link),
number of directed links Ldirα , reciprocity rα and in-degree/out-degree correlation ρ(k
in
α , k
out
α ). Greek indices mark network
types. Properties of the corresponding undirected networks: number of undirected links Lundirα , average degree k¯α, clustering
coefficient Cα and ratio to the corresponding random graph clustering Cα/C
rand
α . The networks, when considered as separate
entities, present distinct types of organization depending on the nature of the interactions. Positively (negatively) connoted
links present high (low) values of rα, ρ(k
in
α , k
out
α ) and Cα.
Positive ties Negative ties
Friends PMs Trades Enemies Attacks Bounties Envelope (all αs)
directed Nα 4,313 5,877 18,589 2,906 7,992 2,980 18,819
Ldirα 31,929 185,908 796,733 21,183 57,479 5,096 967,205
rα 0.68 0.84 0.57 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.59
ρ(kinα , k
out
α ) 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.11 0.64 0.31 0.95
undirected Lundirα 21,118 107,448 568,923 20,008 53,603 4,593 679,404
k¯α 9.79 36.57 61.21 13.77 13.41 3.08 72.20
Cα 0.25 0.28 0.43 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.42
Cα/C
rand
α 109.52 45.71 131.95 6.13 37.27 13.88 109.93
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Fig. 2. Cumulative in-degree and out-degree distributions for the six types of net-
works spanning the same set of agents: (a) friendship, (b) communication, (c) trade,
(d) enmity, (e) attack, (f) bounty. Note the differences between in- and out-degree
distributions and the presence of power-laws (with cutoffs) for negatively connoted
interactions (right column), which are absent for positive ties (left column). It is
immediately clear that topological properties of social networks depend strongly on
the nature of their ties. Ignoring this multi-relational composition can lead to loss of
essential information.
doing to others what they did to you.
Power-law degree distributions indicate aggressive actions.
Studying cumulative in- and out-degree distributions, we find
pronounced power-law distributions for aggressive behavior,
i.e. attacking (out-degree for attacks), being declared an en-
emy (in-degree for enmity), and punishing/being punished
(out- and in- degree for bounty). Power-laws are absent for
positive (friendship, communication, trade) and passive links
(being attacked), see Fig. 2. This discrepancy in degree dis-
tributions hints at qualitatively different link-growth/rewiring
processes taking place in positive tie networks compared to
the negative ones. For example, the classic network growth
model of preferential attachment [32] leads to a power-law de-
gree distribution. As we have shown in [18], the growth of
enemy networks is well characterized by this model, but not
the growth of friend networks.
Positive links cluster. From Table 1 it is clear that the
positively connoted links show higher clustering coefficients
than negatively connoted ones. High values of the clustering
coefficient are expected for positive interactions due to their
cohesive nature and the benefits of dense sub-graphs for better
performance [33]. The significantly lower values of clustering
for negative values suggests that mechanisms such as triadic
closure [34] are not dominant for negative interactions (see
[SI] for a confirmation), and has its origin in the balance of
signed motifs (see below).
The independent analysis of the different networks reveals
distinct types of organization which depend on the nature of
the links. It is crucial to account for these distinct topologi-
cal properties in models for the dynamics of cooperation and
conflict in human societies. To demonstrate the danger of
not differentiating between types of interactions we include
data on the envelope network (as defined in Materials and
Methods) in Table 1. Neglecting the nature of social ties and
mixing different interactions (even within the same data-set)
results in gross mis-representation of the system, in this case
at least by losing the typical low reciprocity and clustering
observed in negative tie sub-networks.
For a detailed analysis of the time-evolution of single net-
work properties on the same data set (first 445 days in the
Artemis game universe), refer to [18]. There several ‘aging’
or ‘maturing’ effects were reported, such as a decrease of the
clustering coefficient and reciprocity in friend networks over
time.
Network–Network Interactions. Due to strong interactions be-
tween different social relations, a next level of complexity en-
ters when considering the co-existence of different types of
links [35]. From now on, we only focus on undirected ver-
sions of the networks, as defined in Materials and Methods.
To quantify the resulting inter-dependencies between pairs of
networks, we follow two approaches.
On one hand, we focus on the link-overlap between net-
works and calculate the Jaccard coefficient Jαβ between two
different sets of links α and β. The Jaccard coefficient quan-
tifies the interaction between two networks by measuring the
tendency that links simultaneously are present in both net-
works.
On the other hand, we compute correlations ρ(kα, kβ) be-
tween node degrees in different networks (see [SI]). These
coefficients measure to which extent degrees of agents in one
type of network correlate with degrees of the same agents in
another one. If ρ(kα, kβ) is close to 1, players who have many
(few) links in network α have many (few) links in network
β. Note that both measures might be affected by different
network sizes or average degrees. To account for this possi-
bility, we additionally compute correlations ρ(rk(kα), rk(kβ))
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Fig. 3. Link overlap (Jaccard coefficient), degree correlation ρ(kα, kβ) and de-
gree rank correlation ρ(rk(kα), rk(kβ)) for all pairs of networks (ordered by link
overlap), with the notations E for Enmity, F for Friendship, A for Attack, T for Trade,
C for Communication and B for Bounty. Pairs of equal connotation (positive-positive
or negative-negative) are marked with a gray background. These pairs have high
overlaps, while oppositely-connotated pairs have lower overlaps. The various rela-
tions are organized in a non-trivial way, suggesting that agents play very different
roles in different relational networks.
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between rankings of node degrees, where rk represents rank.
Overlap and correlation quantities provide complementary in-
sights into the organization of social structures. In Fig. 3 for
all pairs of networks the three measures are shown. Note that
no causal directions can be implied and that all correlations
are positive. From highest to smallest overlap (from left to
right), Fig. 3. provides the following conclusions:
Communication–Friendship. The pronounced overlap
implies that friends tend to talk with each other. The
equally pronounced correlation attests that players who
communicate with many (few) others tend to have many
(few) friends. The former result was already reported in
[18], where a high fraction of communication partners
was shown to be friends.
Trade–Communication. The high overlap shows that
trade partners have a tendency to communicate with
each other, while the high correlations shows a tendency
of communicators being traders.
Enmity–Attack. The high overlap shows that enemies
tend to attack each other, or that attacks are likely to
lead to enemy markings. The high correlations imply
that aggressors or victims of aggression tend to be in-
volved into many enemy relations.
Communication–Attack. The relatively high overlap
shows that there is a tendency for communication tak-
ing place between players who attack each other. The
relatively high correlation implies that players who com-
municate with many (few) others tend to attack or be at-
tacked by many (few) players. Aggression is not anony-
mous, but accompanied by communication.
Enmity–Bounty and Attack–Bounty. Similar to
Enmity–Attack.
Communication–Enmity. Similar to Communication–
Attack.
Trade–Friendship. Similar to Trade–Communication,
however with a smaller overlap. It is more difficult for
traders to become friends than to just communicate.
Friendship–Attack. The low overlap shows that attacks
tend to not take place between friends, or that fighting
players do not tend to become friends. The relatively
high correlations mean that players with many (few)
friends attack or are attacked by many (few) others.
Trade–Attack. Similar to Friendship–Attack.
Communication–Bounty. Similar to Communication–
Attack and Communication–Enmity, however with
much smaller overlap and degree correlations.
Trade–Enmity. For this and all other interactions, over-
lap vanishes. Players who trade with each other almost
never become enemies and vice versa.
Friendship–Bounty. Similar to Communication–Bounty.
Friendship–Enmity. The degree (rank) correlation is
substantial, suggesting that players who are socially ac-
tive tend to establish both positive as well as negative
links. However, the vanishing overlap shows the absence
of ambivalent relations. Friends are never enemies.
Trade–Bounty. This interaction shows the smallest val-
ues for all three properties, which could be due to sub-
stantial differences in network sizes. The relatively small
correlation may suggest that players who are experi-
enced in trade have a tendency to not act out negative
sentiments by spending money on bounties.
The exact values of the two correlation measures have to
be interpreted with some caution. High values might be bi-
ased by e.g. the time a player spent in the game or by ignoring
link weights for the number of exchanged private messages or
traded money. Nevertheless, low values of ρ(kα, kβ) indicate
that hubs in one network are not necessarily hubs in another
(see e.g. the Trade–Enmity case), suggesting that agents play
very different roles in different relational networks. For exam-
ple agents can be central for flows of information but periph-
eral for flows of goods [36]. In the [SI] Text we give further
relations between above network-network measures and study
their evolutions in time (see Figs. S1 and S2).
Large-Scale Empirical Test of Structural Balance. In the fol-
lowing we assign +(-)1 to a positively (negatively) connoted
link. All friendship links have a value of +1, all enemy links
-1. Social balance focuses on signed triads where the sign of
a triad is the product of the signs of its three links.
Social balance theory – in its strong form [28] – claims that
positive triads are ‘balanced’ while negative triads are ‘unbal-
anced’, see Fig. 4. Unbalanced triads are sources of stress
and therefore tend to be avoided by agents when they update
their personal relationships. From a physics point of view, the
resulting dynamics can be viewed as an energy minimization
process which may lead to jammed states [37] due to a rugged
energy landscape [38]. There is a ‘weak formulation’ of struc-
tural balance [39] which postulates that triads with exactly
two positive links are underrepresented in real networks, while
the three other kinds of triads should be much more abundant.
In the weak formulation only situations where “the friend of
my friend is my enemy” are unstable, whereas in the strong
form of structural balance, “the enemy of my enemy is my
Strong formulation 
of balance
Weak formulation 
of balance
B
+ + +
- - -
- --+ +
+
B U
U B U
B B
26,329 4,428 39,519 8,032
10,608 30,145 28,545 9,009
71 -112 47 -5
Fig. 4. Different types of signed triads, balanced (B) or unbalanced (U) accord-
ing to the strong or weak formulation of structural balance. We show the number
of each type of triad N∆ in the friendship-enmity multiplex network, the expected
number Nrand∆ of such triads when averaged over 1000 sign-randomizations and the
corresponding z-score (see [SI]). Triads + + + and + − − are over-represented,
+ +− triads are underrepresented with extraordinary significance.
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Fig. 5. Ratio of signed triad types over time. Left: Measured in the data. Center:
Expected in the random null model, see [SI]. Right: Simulation of signed triadic clo-
sure (STC) with a model based on wedge transition rates, see [SI]. Initial condition:
Measured network of day 100. All ratios measured in the data deviate significantly
from ratios in the null model, except for the−−− triads. The STC model reproduces
the observed ratios considerably better.
enemy” is also unstable, see Fig. 4.
To test social balance we focus on the multiplex network
of friendship and enmity interactions. The number of differ-
ent types of triads are labeled N∆. They are compared to the
expected number of such triads in a null model (re-shuffled
signs of links, N rand∆ , see [SI]). In Fig. 4, a standard measure
of statistical deviation, the z-score (see [SI]), shows that +++
and +−− triads are heavily over-represented, while ++− tri-
ads are heavily under-represented with respect to pure chance.
Triads of type −−− are under-represented to a lesser degree
than the three other types, favoring the weak formulation of
structural balance over Heider’s original formulation of bal-
ance theory. It is obvious that triads are characterized by
different levels of stability. The robustness of these results
is further confirmed by examining the time evolution of the
number of triads in friendship/enmity networks over all 445
days, Fig. 5.
A detailed dynamical analysis of our data further reveals
that a vast majority of changes in the network are due to
the creation of new positive and negative links, not due to
switching of existing links from plus to minus or vice versa.
We illustrate this dominance of link destruction and creation
over sign switching on the dynamics of the following triadic
structures. Let us define a wedge as a signed undirected triad
with two links, i.e. a triad with one link missing (a ‘hole’).
There are three possible wedge types: ++, +−, −−. We
measure day-to-day transitions from wedges to other possible
triadic structures. In the vast majority of all cases (> 99.9%),
a wedge stays unchanged. In case of change, most often a hole
is closed by either a positive or a negative link, see [SI] Fig. 3.
The removal of a link is less frequent; sign switches almost
never occur. This result is in marked contrast with many dy-
namical models of structural balance [37] which assume that a
given social network is fully connected from the start and that
only the link-signs are the relevant dynamical parameters,
which evolve to reduce stress in the system. Our observation
underpins that network sparsity and growth are fundamental
properties and they need to be incorporated in any reasonable
model of dynamics of positive and antagonistic forces in social
systems. In full agreement with the results shown in Fig. 4
and Fig. 5, wedges of type ++ close preferentially (about 7
times more likely) with a positive link, wedges of type +−
close preferentially (about 11 times more likely) with a neg-
ative link. There is no clear sign preference in the closure of
type −− wedges. For details see [SI] and [SI] Figs. 3–5.
We collect empirical transition rates in a transition ma-
trix MSTC, which we use in a simple dynamical model for
Signed Triadic Closure (STC), see [SI]. This STC model ap-
plies MSTC on a daily state vector of signed wedges. These
wedges are closed or left unchanged according to the elements
of MSTC. With this model we are able to reproduce the em-
pirical observations to a reasonable extent, see Fig. 5 (right).
Discussion
Most empirical studies of large-scale social networks focus on
node properties [5], for instance to uncover the topological
centrality of social agents or patterns of homophily between
agents [40], while being blind to the multiple nature of the
links connecting agents. In many social systems, however, a
proper description of multiplexity is essential to capture the
stress caused by different forces acting on social agents and
therefore to uncover the principles shaping the large-scale or-
ganization of social interactions. For instance, the interaction
and co-existence of multiple relations are crucial to describe
the emergence of conflict in social systems [41, 42, 43] or the
development of trust in commercial networks [44].
Our work begins to quantitatively measure the multi-
dimensionality of human relationships. Its results shed light
on macroscopic implications of interaction types: Relations
driven by aggression lead to markedly different systemic char-
acteristics than relations of non-aggressive nature. Network-
network interactions reveal a non-trivial structure of this
multi-dimensionality, and how humans play very different
roles in different relational networks. The richness of the data-
set allows to explore the effect of multiple relations on the
structure and stability of a large-scale social network, thereby
providing a first empirical basis for the modeling of multiplex
complex networks. Future research perspectives include dif-
ferent generalizations of structural balance theory, e.g. to a
larger set of social relations, to the case of weighted and/or
directed networks or to larger motifs, an extension of the con-
cept of modularity for multiplex [7] or signed [45] networks
but also dynamical aspects, for instance the dynamics of non-
cooperative organizations [46].
Materials and Methods
Social Network Data from the Online Game ‘Pardus’. The
data-set contains practically all actions of all players of the
MMOG Pardus (www.pardus.at) since 2004 when the game
went online [18]. Pardus is an open-ended game with a world-
wide player-base of more than 300,000 people. Players live
in a virtual, futuristic universe which they explore and where
they interact with others in a multitude of ways to achieve
their own goals [22]. Here we focus on one of the three sep-
arate game universes, Artemis, in which N = 18, 819 players
have interacted with at least one other player over the first
445 consecutive days of this universe’s existence.
Players typically engage in various economic activities to
accumulate wealth. Communication between any two players
can take place directly, by using a one-to-one, email-like , pri-
vate message system (PM), see [SI], or indirectly, by meeting
in built-in chat channels or online forums. Social and eco-
nomical decisions of players are often strongly influenced and
driven by social factors such as friendship, cooperation and
conflict. Conflictual relations may result in aggressive acts
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such as attacks, fights, revenge, even destruction of another
player’s means of production or transportation. Under cer-
tain conditions, hostile acts may degenerate into large-scale
conflicts between different factions of players – wars.
The Pardus data-set contains longitudinal and relational
data allowing for an almost complete and dynamical mapping
of multiplex relations of an entire society. The data is free of
interviewer effects since agents are not conscious of their ac-
tions being logged. Measurement errors which usually affect
reliability of survey data [47], are practically absent. The lon-
gitudinal aspect of the data allows for the analysis of dynam-
ical aspects such as the emergence and evolution of network
structures. Finally, it is possible to extract multiple social
relationships between a fixed set of humans. We focus on the
following set of six types of one-to-one interactions between
players (for details see [SI]): friendship and enmity relations,
private message (PM) communication, trades, attacks, and re-
venge/punishment through head money (bounties). We label
these networks by Greek indices: α = 1 refers to friendship
networks, . . . , α = 6 to bounties. We focus on one-to-one
interactions only (without projections as e.g. used in [48, 49])
and discard indirect interactions such as mere participation in
a chat.
Friendship and enmity networks are taken as snapshots at
the last available day 445. All other networks are aggregated
over time, meaning that whenever a link existed within day
1 and 445, it is counted as a link. For simplicity, we use un-
weighted, directed networks. Further, we define undirected
networks as follows: A link exists between nodes i and j if
there exists at least one directional link between those nodes.
We construct triads (motifs of three connected nodes [1]) from
undirected links. For a combined analysis of the whole system
we define an envelope network which is composed of the set
of all links of all interaction types. In the envelope network,
a link from i to j exists if it exists in at least one of the six
relational networks.
Network Measures. Network Measures. The statistical prop-
erties of the six networks have beenstudied as separate entities
using the following notations and measures. Nα is the number
of nodes in the network type α, and L
dir(undir)
α is the num-
ber of (un)directed links. Reciprocity is labeled by rα, and
ρ(kinα , k
out
α ) is the correlation of in- and out-degrees within the
α network. Average degree, clustering coefficient, and clus-
tering coefficient with respect to the corresponding random
graph are marked by k¯α, Cα and Cα/C
rand
α , respectively. For
more details, see the [SI] Text.
Network Interactions.For network-network interactions, we
compute the Jaccard coefficient which measures the interac-
tion between two networks by measuring the tendency that
links simultaneously are present in both networks. Jαβ is a
similarity score between two sets of elements and is defined
as the size of the intersection of the sets divided by the size
of their union [50], Jαβ ≡ |α ∩ β|/|α ∪ β|. Related similarity
measures, such as the cosine similarity measure lead to com-
parable results. The correlation measures used are described
in detail in the [SI].
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